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Abstract
There has been rapid de facto trade integration in ASEAN+3 over the past 
decades, and experts have noted that this leads to greater de facto financial 
integration. These two therefore have reinforcing effects on each other. How-
ever, this cycle brings with it systemic financial risks that could lead to balance 
of payments crises, capital reversals, and exchange rate variability from cur-
rent account imbalances which have caused global disruptions historically. 
The way to keep history from repeating itself is to address these risks. The 
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) is one way of doing so, by pro-
viding an insurance mechanism that can safeguard the trigger points for said 
crises. However, the development of de jure integration policies such as this 
has been slow, much slower than policies that further trade integration, pos-
ing a systemic risk. This paper clarifies the implications of this; discusses the 
possible reasons for this discrepancy; and provides potential solutions that 
will enable ASEAN+3 to speed up the process of prudent financial integration.
Keywords
ASEAN+3, CMIM, financial integration, FTA, trade integration, systemic 
risks
Context: Development of Regional Trade and Financial Coope-
ration in ASEAN + 3
The ASEAN+3 is a regional economic cooperation mechanism estab-
lished among the ASEAN economies2 and the Plus (+) 3 economies including 
China (and Hong Kong), Japan and South Korea. The group first met during 
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 as a mechanism to promote regional finan-
cial cooperation and avoid future liquidity crises.3 Since then, it has evolved 
into a set of over fifty bodies, hosting an annual summit, and a cooperation 
framework in 20 areas including macroeconomic coordination, trade, finance, 
food security and energy. This section describes the advances the group has 
achieved in terms of financial cooperation and trade liberalization.
In 2001, ASEAN+3 leaders decided to seek trade liberalization among the 
economies.4 Trade liberalization among ASEAN economies was already ad-
vanced via the ASEAN Free Trade Area. Further trade liberalization involved the 
negotiation of agreements between ASEAN and the plus 3 economies (China, 
Japan and South Korea). This initiative translated into the bilateral free trade 
agreements negotiated between ASEAN and each of these economies and that 
came into force between 2006 and 2010.5 This is often described as an ASE-
2 These include: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thai-
land, Singapore, Vietnam.
3 The Asian Financial Crisis evidenced the interdependence of trade, investment and financial flows among 
the different economies in East Asia. Therefore the long-term solutions required a regional approach 
leading to financial cooperation. The ASEAN leaders extended an invitation to other economies in East 
Asia to envision a mechanism on financial cooperation aiming at avoiding future liquidity crisis. From the 
perspective of Sussangkarn (2011), the rationale behind this form of cooperation was simple: while some 
countries in the region had saving deficits, other economies such as China, Japan and Singapore were 
running of savings surpluses. The region needed a mechanism to channel the surplus of some countries 
into liquidity for the others in times of crisis. This was particularly important after the experience of coun-
tries like Indonesia and South Korea where the implementation of IMF programs had high political costs.
4 In 2001 ASEAN+3 countries launched The East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), to map out the major purposes, 
basic principles, and specific measures of cooperation in the region. The EAVG proposed the establishment 
of the East Asian summit, the East Asia Forum and the East Asia Free Trade Area as long-term goals.
5 The first negotiation to conclude was the ASEAN-Korea free trade agreement. The agreement was 
ratified and came into force in 2006. This agreement was followed by the ASEAN-Japan Free trade 
agreement concluded in 2007 and implemented since December 2008 including areas of trade of goods, 
services, investments, rules of origin and disputes settlement. The last of these agreements was the 
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AN+1+1+1. However, the region has not to the date negotiated a multilateral 
trade liberalization agreement among the 13 participant economies. 
One of the earliest proposals for such multilateral arrangement was the East 
Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) suggested by China in 2001 and the later ini-
tiative for the ASEAN+6 Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia 
(CEPEA) also including Australia, New Zealand and India as proposed by 
Japan. These two initiatives eventually merged into an ASEAN centered pro-
cess currently known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP). The negotiations of the RCEP as a region-wide (ASEAN+6) free trade 
area were launched in 2012 and are still in the early stages of the negotiation. 
Parallel to the RCEP, China, Japan and South Korea begun the negotiation of a 
Trilateral Free Trade Agreement in 2013. This agreement could eventually also 
be expanded to include ASEAN members. Both initiatives are far from conclu-
sion due to the enormous historical and trade-related differences among the 
participating economies.
The benefits of the evolution of the current network of bilateral agreements 
towards an ASEAN+3 wide Free Trade Area have been discussed in the work 
of Urata (2007) who demonstrated the “trade creation”6 effect of the estab-
lishment of this kind of agreement among the economies in the region. Kwan 
and Qui (2010) explain the trade creation effects of an ASEAN+3 trade agree-
ment from the perspective of the complementarity of the natural endowments, 
technology advancement and industrial structures of the countries in the re-
gion. Other authors such as Bhagwati (2008), Menon (2013), and Fukunaga 
and Isono (2013) explain the importance of an ASEAN+3 trade agreement as 
a mechanism to harmonize trade liberalization across the region. From their 
perspective, a free trade area including the 13 economies would reduce the 
risk of a potential “noodle-bowl” effect due to the differences in terms of rules 
of origin (ROO) and non-tariff barriers that exist on the current bilateral agree-
ments between ASEAN and the plus 3 economies.
Parallel with trade integration, the first stages towards regional financial coop-
eration were the establishment of the ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy 
Dialogue (ERPD) in May 2000, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) later that year, 
and the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) established in 2001. The ERPD is 
a surveillance and policy dialogue mechanism between the Finance Ministers 
of ASEAN+3 economies. The CMI was conceived as a series of bilateral swap 
agreements among ASEAN+3 economies with the purpose of constituting 
a regional liquidity pool to be used in case of problems with the balance of 
payments. The ABMI promoted the integration of regional capital markets and 
aimed to mobilize international reserves into regional markets therefore con-
tributing to regional financial stability.
The initial push towards these initiatives started to wane in the following years 
as a consequence of rapid economic growth in the region and the accumula-
tion of currency reserves as an alternative mechanism to have liquidity. These 
initiatives were tested during the 2008-2009 economic crisis. During this time, 
regional economies facing liquidity crisis opted to negotiate bilateral swap 
agreements with the US Federal Reserve (Singapore and Korea) and with Chi-
na (Indonesia) instead of using the CMI pool of reserves. 
ASEAN-China free trade agreement, which came into effect in January 2010 including zero-tariff trade, 
services and investments.
6 Urata’s findings point towards “trade creation” effects of an ASEAN+3 agreement, as oppose of the 
“trade diversion” effect often occurred during first years of other regional free trade areas such as NAFTA 
and Mercosur. In a similar line, Petri, Plummer and Zhai (2011) on their assessment of the RCEP (including 
ASEAN+6) estimated that annual welfare gains would raise to US$215 billion by 2025, mostly from the 
liberalization of trade and services between China, Japan and Korea (therefore trade liberalization only 
among ASEAN+3 economies would have a similar effect).
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Research Question, Aims and Focus
The previous section contextualizes the research question. Evidently, trade and 
financial integration in ASEAN+3 have had contrasting fortunes, with the latter 
receiving constant criticism. In this light, the question this paper addresses is:
“What are the implications of the discrepancy between the develop-
ment of trade and financial integration in Asia on system risk, and what 
can be done to address these?”
The first aim for this paper is to assess the implications for the said discre-
pancy, from the perspective of financial crises. The next is to explore a pos-
sible solution to this issue, and the causes behind its delayed growth and 
implementation. The last is to offer possible solutions for improving regional 
cooperation in preventing future crises. 
The focus of the paper is on East Asia, which has mostly positive experiences 
with trade integration but contrastingly negative experiences with financial in-
tegration. In scoping the policy recommendations, the paper is focused on the 
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) as the main form of financial 
integration in East Asia. It seeks to understand the reason behind its lagging 
institutional development. Last, it seeks to draw insights from more successful 
experiences in developing regional cooperation, benchmarking with strate-
gies applied by the European Union (EU) in the past.
Research Methodologies Implemented
To address the research question, the group applied two key methodol-
ogies. Dynamic causal loop analysis, and historical analysis combined with 
literature reviews, and comparative institutional assessment with a benchmark 
institution.
Dynamic causal loop analysis 
The first method, dynamic causal loop analysis, is well-established in the field 
of dynamic modelling, also known as system dynamics. It involves laying out the 
factors that are influencing a particular problem, identifying the links between 
these factors, and in turn, the directionality (meaning, a positive or a negative im-
pact) for each of the links. This is important because two factors which affect one 
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another over time in a positive way can lead to reinforcing or “snowball” effects. 
For instance, in the context of a savings account, higher investments leads to 
higher total savings, which then leads to even higher interest gained. 
In contrast, factors can have a negative impact on one another over time, 
leading to a balancing effect. For instance, in in-door heaters which seek to 
maintain certain room temperature, an initial low level of temperature leads 
a heater to burn fuel to raise the room temperature. If the room temperature 
increases too much, the heater, then brings the room temperature back down. 
In both cases, the process is dynamic because these factors influence one 
another over time, with one factor leading to another. These two factors are 
illustrated in the table below.
Table 1. Illustration of Causal Loop Analysis
Balancing Effect Reinforcing (“Snowball”) Effect
Factor 1 (e.g. Room
Temperature Adjustment) Factor 2 (e.g. Heater'sMeasured Temperature)
+
-
Link 1 (e.g. Increase
in Temperature)
Link 2 (e.g. Reduction
in Temperature)
Factor 1 (e.g.
Savings)
Factor 2
(e.g. Interest
from
Savings)
+
+
Link 1 (e.g. Interest
generation)
Link 2 (e.g. Inflow
to Savings)
The factors considered often have multiple loops and directionalities. In inte-
grating these, simple multiplication of the signs is done to identify the systemic 
outcome. As shown below, having the same sign leads to a reinforcing effect, 
and opposite signs leads to a balancing effect. 
Table 2: Simple Multiplication of Two Links to Identify Systemic Outcomes
Sign of First Link Sign of Second Link Systemic Outcome
Positive Positive Reinforcing Effect
Positive Negative Balancing Effect
Negative Positive Balancing Effect
Negative Negative Reinforcing Effect
By extension, a chain of causal loops could lead to a snowball effect if there is 
an even number of negative signs (e.g. negative + negative + positive); and 
it could lead to a balancing effect if there is an odd number of negative signs 
(e.g. negative + negative + negative + positive). 
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In the context of the research question, the outcome examined is the risk of 
a financial crisis. The way to analyze the impact of factors to said risk is that if 
there are reinforcing effects in factors related to risk, this implies magnification 
of the said risk (i.e. the risk of another financial crisis). This then contributes to 
recommendations on addressing that risk based on which of those factors are 
critical to reversing the trends.
Historical analysis and literature reviews 
The next methods, historical analysis and literature reviews, are an essen-
tial partner of causal loop analysis, but also have stand-alone functions. First, 
they validate the relationship between the factors in the initial risk diagrams 
developed, based on past events. Next, they also make possible the equally 
herculean task of understanding the factors affecting the risk drivers and how 
they could actually be addressed. In this process, the group looked into the 
reasons behind the reluctance of countries to make use of the CMIM. The 
output of this process was the identification of the key reasons for the slow 
growth of regional institutions for financial cooperation in mitigating the risks 
uncovered from dynamic causal loop analysis. 
Comparative institutional assessment
In the last method, comparative institutional assessment, the group ben-
chmarked ASEAN+3 with the European Union (EU), which has had better 
progress on regards to developing regional institutions that are crucial for ad-
dressing systemic risk. Building on the historical analysis of factors impeding 
the growth of said institutions in ASEAN+3, the team looked at what the EU 
has done differently to make its own institutions work. 
In combination the three research methodologies allowed the group to unco-
ver the possible trajectories of future financial risk at the level of international 
and country-level trade and finance, to identify issues behind the slow growth 
of regional institutions which could mitigate risks, and to derive possible re-
commendations for addressing said issues at the institutional level (learning 
from comparatively more successful examples).
Findings: Causal Loop Analysis For Drivers Of Trade And Finan-
cial Integration, And Implications For Financial Crises
Reinforcing Effect between Regional De Facto Trade and Regional Integration
Regional trade cooperation leads to greater regional trade integration. 
According to the Asian Development Bank’s Asian Regional Integration Cen-
ter (ARIC), trade among ASEAN+3 economies has increased on average by 
10.8% annually since 1990. De facto trade integration (“in fact”, or actual in-
tegration measurable quantitatively) is commonly measured in increases in 
exports, although from the perspective of individual countries, these are mea-
sured in terms of the ratio of exports to GDP (Cheung, Yiu and Chow, 2008). 
At the regional level, this is measured in trade within the region (intra-regional 
trade) in merchandise (goods) and commercial services.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) shows that trade integration has 
been growing in Asia, and this has been driven by the emergence of cross-bor-
der production networks. This has further been driven by “increasing comple-
mentarity among countries” as well as an “increasing shift in organisational focus 
from the firm to the ‘contractual network of firms tied together by mutual long-
term interest’” (MAS, 2007:63; Stopford, 1994). Said network structures have led 
to increasing trade in intermediate parts needed for production (MAS, 2007:64).
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What are the implications of increased trade integration? Aizenman (2005) 
notes that trade integration leads to financial integration through the following 
mechanism: 
• Increased intra-regional trade and investment can generate greater 
demand for cross-border trade-financing activities and capital flows;
• Greater trade openness increases the effective cost of restrictions on 
capital flows, creating the impetus for further financial openness and 
integration
Figure 1: Reinforcing Effect between Trade and Financial Integration
Greater financial integration then leads back to increased trade integration:
• Deeper financial integration should help to channel Asia’s large pool of 
savings towards financing investment within the region. The pooling of 
liquidity could reduce financing costs for (regional) firms and encour-
age investment, the expansion of regional production networks, and 
therefore, trade integration.
These insights therefore show that there are positive feedback effects of trade 
and financial integration on each other. 
What are the implications of the reinforcing link between trade and financial 
integration on the risks of future financial crises? In the next section, literature 
reviews on the past financial crises provide insight on how either of the two 
have led to past financial crises.
Impact of Financial Integration on Balance of Payment Shocks: 
First Generation Crises
First generation financial crises occurred in the 1980s. Greater financial 
interdependence led to a higher percentage of banking sector assets and lia-
bilities held in foreign currencies. This then led to greater vulnerability of banks 
to internal shocks whenever external shocks in debtor/creditor countries oc-
curred. These then lead to balance of payment shocks. Moreover, whenever a 
large portion of debt were foreign denominated, this led to exchange rate fluc-
tuations, and therefore, balance of trade shocks as well. Given these dynam-
ics, Figure 2, below, shows that the reinforcing effect between financial and 
trade interdependence could lead to a greater risk of first generation financial 
crises, a re-enactment of what happened in the 1980s.
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Figure 2: First Generation Crises — Balance of Payments
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Impact of Reinforcing Effect on Capital Flows: Second Generation Crises
The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98, an example of a Second Gener-
ation Crisis, was largely driven by increased trade integration, which led to 
greater financial integration within the Asian region. This then resulted in large 
inflows of capital, especially to the net exporting countries. However, random 
events such as sudden capital outflows from countries whose exchange rates 
showed unfavourable trends triggered other countries to simply withdraw their 
investments. This then led to capital reversals. The top portion of Figure 3 
show this.
Figure 3: Second Generation Crisis — Increased Capital Flows and Contagion 
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The real threat, as the crisis has shown, is that given information asymmetry 
(meaning, no one in the market had certainty as to what would happen in the 
future), decisions were made in an uncoordinated manner. The bottom portion 
of Figure 3 shows that whenever countries have insufficient information (“infor-
mation asymmetry”) about the actual state of the ailing country, they tend to 
copy the behaviour of the market, making capital withdrawal a “contagious” 
phenomenon. Last, since massive capital outflows reduced the ability of cou-
ntries to stem the impacts of previous outflows. 
Figure 3 shows succinctly that in the face of financial integration and inter-
dependence, the task of balancing an economy and stemming instability is 
MAP | REVISTA MUNDO ASIA PACÍFICO71
made more difficult by market instability. As a result, risks of future crises are 
magnified by the reinforcing effect between trade and financial integration, as 
the amount of reserves adequate for overcoming these risks can be very high.
Impact of Trade Interdependence on Current Account Imbalances: Third Gene-
ration Crises
Last, the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis exemplifies that increasing trade 
interdependence also leads to higher potential exchange rate instability 
through the current account imbalances. This was known as Third Generation 
financial crises.
Figure 4: Third Generation Crisis — Current Account Imbalances
Exports Exchange
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Figure 4 shows that regionally and globally as well, increased trade interde-
pendence between developed nations in the West and developing nations in 
the East (as a result of increased exports) allowed for the financial crisis in the 
US to affect Asia. The reason was that this generated large trade surpluses 
on the side of Asia, and have largely affected exchange rate appreciation on 
Asia’s part (given that trade has been done in US dollar terms). This then led 
to consistent trade surpluses, also known as “current account imbalances”.
The implication of these trends was that these increased the exposure of a 
country to the risk of crisis whenever the net importing countries in the West 
faced contractionary GDP gaps. In the 2007-08 crisis, the US economy faced 
a slump, reducing their capacities to import. This led to volatility in the trade 
balances and as a result, in exchange rates, of net exporting countries. In the 
future, greater trade interdependence naturally increases the risk of instability, 
as is described in Figure 4. 
Contagion Magnifying Risks of Instability from First, Second and Third Genera-
tion Crises
The three risks mentioned earlier, based on past experience, were mag-
nified by information asymmetry. The reason is that bad decisions tend to 
spread, whenever there is no adequate information on the causes of disrup-
tions (e.g. if investors knew disruptions were temporary, they would not im-
mediately pull out). As such, a crisis in one country affects other countries, 
through contagion (Figure 4). 
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Figure 5: Implications — Overall Regional Crises Increasing
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Implications of Reinforcing Effects and Crises
The risks of any of the three generations of crisis are currently increasing, 
with deepening financial and trade interdependence globally as well as re-
gionally. These are further magnified by the contagion effects, resulting from 
information asymmetry and contagion. An implication that can be drawn from 
of the dynamic causal loop analysis is that it is not sufficient for countries to 
accumulate reserves at the country level alone. In effect, the ideal reserve-ad-
equacy ratio would be very high. In addition, the option of bilateral swaps still 
poses a risk, as this is not an automatic mechanism (e.g. it takes time to draw 
agreements for swaps, and one country’s failure immediately affects the oth-
er). The analysis points to the need for regional cooperation, both to provide 
sufficient reserves and to ensure cooperation by countries. We explore this 
further in the next section.
Findings: Historical Analysis Of Factors Driving Slowdowns In 
Financial Regional Cooperation, Focusing On CMIM
As mentioned at the beginning, the initial push towards these initiatives 
started to wane in the following years: countries have resorted to accumu-
lating currency reserves and having bilateral trade during crises, rather than 
turning to the CMIM. The previous section likewise showed that said bilateral 
swaps would not be a sufficient insurance mechanism to ward off the next 
crisis -simply put, financial and trade integration are both drivers for financial 
crises, but are also mutually reinforcing-. The implication was that there is 
a need for greater regional cooperation to avert future crises. We now ex-
plore the difficulties faced in the development of institutional arrangements, as 
these could hamper the development of regional cooperation.
Progress of Institutional Arrangements in Addressing Increasing Risks
Several authors, including Sussangkarn (2011), Park and Song (2011) 
and Dent (2013), describe a series of reasons explaining countries’ choices 
of using bilateral agreements instead of using the CMI initiative. The first one 
is related to the size of the funds. South Korea for example was entitled to 
US$18.5 billion under the CMI agreements. This amount is small compared 
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to the US$30 billion obtained from the United States’ Federal Reserve Bank 
(data from Dent 2013). According to these authors, another apparent reason 
for the dismissal of the CMI funds was the link to IMF. Under the CMI the 
countries could only access up to 20% of the funds without pursuing a pro-
gram with IMF. In a regional context where many of the countries still resent 
the IMF-imposed reforms after the Asian Financial crisis this condition was 
far from ideal. Another limitation with CMI is that nobody knows if its use 
would create the same confidence effects that a swap with the US Federal 
Reserve generates among investors.
The failure of the CMI to serve as a first line of defense against liquidity short-
ages led the regional leaders to the reform of the mechanism. Established in 
2010, the CMIM pooled the bilateral swap agreements into a single multilateral 
contract. The rationale was to have larger reserve pool and a more institution-
alized mechanism.7 The CMIM established a self-managed reserved pooling8 
for US$120 billion and defined a centralized decision-making procedure for 
contribution and borrowing accessibility. An additional initiative to strengthen 
7 Even before the 2008 crisis, Kuroda and Kawai (2003) envision the necessity that “A framework for 
regional financial cooperation may include three areas: regional surveillance and monitoring for crisis/
contagion prevention; schemes to augment international liquidity for crisis management; and programs 
to assist crisis-affected countries to resolve the systemic impact of the crisis and accelerate the recovery 
process” towards a more effective financial cooperation in East Asia. The reforms introduced with the 
CMIM aim in the directions suggested by these authors.
8 Under the self-managed reserves pool, ASEAN+3 members committed to make funds available, howe-
ver the money remains in the Central Banks. This is why some authors adduce that the agreement is 
not really a reserve fund. The countries commit to make funds available but are not actually polling them 
beforehand. 
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regional financial cooperation was the creation of the ASEAN+3 Macroeco-
nomic Research Office (AMRO) in 2011. The AMRO was established as a 
mechanism “to monitor and analyse regional economies, contributing to the 
early detection of risks, swift implementation of remedial actions, and effective 
decision-making of the CMIM”.9
Table 3: Developments to the CMIM after 2012.
Previous (2010) Announced May 2012
Size of pool US$120 billion US$240 billion
IMF de-linked portion 20%
30% and up to 40% in 2014 (subject 
to review)
Maturity (full amount) 90 days 12 months with 2 renewals
Supporting period (full amount) 2 years 3 years
Maturity (IMF de-linked) 90 days 6 months with 3 renewals
Supporting period (full amount) 1 year 2 years
Scope facilities
Crisis resolution 
function
Crisis resolution function renamed as 
CMIM stability facility.
Introduction of crisis prevention 
function: CMIM precautionary line.
Source: Siregar and Chabchitrchaidol (2013). 
Why Has Regional Financial Cooperation Lagged behind Regional 
Trade Cooperation?
Amid increasing risks from financial and trade integration -risks which are 
too high for a state to depend on itself solely-, the pace of the development of 
agreements in regional financial cooperation has lagged behind that of trade 
cooperation.
If there is one area in the integration process of East Asia that can be said to 
be successful, it has to be trade, as can be shown from the previous part. In-
deed, it is trade integration that helped propel East Asia to a whole new level of 
economic development, which in turn gave the region much bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the developed world such as the EU and the US.
One could argue that formal multilateral or region-wide frameworks are still 
lacking in East Asia (except for ASEAN) and therefore, de jure trade integration 
isn’t so successful. But the abundance of bilateral agreements and the de 
facto regional trade integration and, more broadly, trade interdependence are 
more important indicators.
On the other hand, despite all the professed interest and enthusiasm, financial 
integration, another crucial component in the regional integration efforts, has 
stalled in both de facto and de jure senses. In fact, it has lagged far behind 
trade integration in both breadth and depth. Which begs the question: why 
can’t financial integration in East Asia keep pace with trade integration?
The answer can be found in a number of factors.
To begin with, the intellectual underpinnings of trade integration and financial 
integration have not seen paralleling developing and the different swings and 
shifts ensure they are often not on the same page.
Since Adam Smith made a powerful case for free trade in 1776, the doc-
trine has endured all kinds of scrutiny, sometimes coming under scathing 
attacks. “Yet the idea of free trade, the conceptual case for free trade, has 
9 Idem.
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survived largely intact against the tide of repeated critical inquiry” (Irwin, 
1996:10). Practitioners and politicians tend to deride academicians for their 
detachment from the real world. But as John Maynard Keynes’ famous quo-
te illustrates, the ideas of these scholars are more powerful than commonly 
understood. Indeed, even in times of economic crisis, such as the latest 
global recession, when there would normally be strong protectionist and 
nationalist sentiments, countries would still engage in and push for trade 
integration to varying degrees, guided by the idea that closer trade relations 
will bring substantial benefits.
However, the picture is quite different for financial integration. Although the 
history of financial integration can be traced back to more than three centuries 
ago, the related theories only flourished after the demise of Bretton Woods 
systems. And unlike its trade integration counterpart, studies on financial in-
tegration often produce inconsistent or even conflicting conclusions, extolling 
the virtues of financial deregulation at one time (such as the 1980s and early 
1990s) while urging caution and questioning the benefits of closer financial 
integration on economic growth at the other (such as now) (Gehringer, 2013). 
It is no more typified than the IMF’s “ideological shift” on capital controls in 
2012 from opposition to acceptance (IMF Staff Papers, 2012).
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the progress of financial inte-
gration has generally trailed that of trade integration. But the yawning gap in 
East Asia also has much more to do with its experiences in these two areas.
For its dealings in trade, East Asia’s experience has largely been positive. 
Since the 1960s, a succession of East Asian economies already began to 
adopt more open trade and investment policies instead of the inward-looking 
development strategies. Then the 1970s and 1980s saw the rise of the “Asian 
Tigers”. After China joined the WTO in 2001, East Asia has been rapidly tur-
ning itself into a new center of world economic growth. Most agree that the 
“East Asia Miracle” is largely attributable to the openness of East Asia to fore-
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ign trade, with the establishment of a series of bilateral free trade areas, such 
as the ASEAN FTA and the three ASEAN+1 FTAs.
But the region’s memory of financial integration is quite negative, with the 
specter of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis constantly hanging over its 
head, when the region as a whole, and Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand 
in particular, were considered to be treated in a humiliating way by the IMF. 
Indeed, one of the legacies the crisis left is that financial integration is primarily 
driven by a defensive logic to prevent further crisis, rather than guided by a 
forward-looking logic, where deeper financial reforms and better governance 
are perhaps more important (Park and Wyplosz, 2008).
In fact, this mindset led to East Asian countries accumulating large amounts 
of foreign reserves, making the Chiang Mai Initiative, one of the most lau-
ded examples of East Asian financial integration, virtually redundant when 
the 2007-2008 global economic recession struck (Park and Wyplosz, 2008). 
Moreover, East Asia’s attempt to control capital flows seems to also have dis-
credited further financial integration when countries in this region proved to be 
much more resilient during the global financial crisis than others, especially 
the EU, which experienced much more rapid and deeper financial integration. 
And it seems the more integrated the region is, the higher the threat of finan-
cial crisis contagion.
No less significant, the less-than-proactive attitude of East Asian countries 
towards financial liberalization is because trade integration is on balance much 
easier to implement in terms of institutional arrangements compared to financial 
integration, which usually requires highly developed financial regimes. And in-
deed, welfare gains from trade liberalization are considered much more tangible 
and stable than opening up the financial sector (Aizenman, 2005).
Finally, perhaps a more important factor lies in the history and geopolitics 
of East Asia. Unlike Europe, where there has never been such a power do-
minating the whole continent, East Asia was for a long time dominated by 
China before Japan took over at the turn of the 20th century. In between, 
regional powers would also flex their muscles in Southeast Asia. Now, with 
China’s rise and its new assertiveness, a sense of apprehension hangs over 
East Asia. It has left a trail of territorial disputes and seeded deep distrust 
in the region, especially between China and Japan, and China and most of 
the ASEAN nations.
 The implications for integration are three-fold. First, there is great sensitivity 
about the erosion of sovereignty. As a region heavily reliant on trade, govern-
ments in East Asia are quite concerned about the stability of exchange rates. 
Since free capital flows implies they either have to adopt the floating exchan-
ge rate regime or lose control of their monetary policy and being dictated by 
others on what to do and how to do it (especially in light of what happened in 
the Asian Financial Crisis), which may prove to be economically unprofitable 
and politically disastrous; no wonder these countries are reluctant to take con-
crete measures towards closer financial integration, let alone contemplate the 
prospect of a possible single currency.
Second, the progress of integration can be easily hampered by the flare-up 
of any historical or political disputes. Indeed, with trade integration already 
going on for almost five decades, any fresh political disputes can easily stall 
the progress of any financial cooperation attempts, which are still at a rela-
tively incipient stage. Third, while trade integration can be largely driven by 
markets, financial integration needs much more official coordination. But key 
driving countries as France and Germany for the EU integration are constantly 
missing in East Asia. Indeed, any country wishing to exercise leadership in the 
region is perceived with suspicion.
With all these factors combining to make their impact felt, it is little wonder that 
financial integration has lagged behind trade integration in East Asia.
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Findings: Comparative Institutional Analysis, Learning From 
The European Union’s Experience
European Union’s Experience in Regional Financial Cooperation
Addressing these three problems may seem to be an insurmountable task 
requiring changing mindsets and removing political differences. However, are 
these required before one can move forward? Valuable lessons can be learnt 
through the experience of the European Union given its success in moving 
forward with trade and financial cooperation.
The European countries sought to integrate trade and finance simulta-
neously to avoid another world war. To move towards greater trade liberali-
zation, the European Economic Community (EEC) was founded in 1968 and 
the Single Market was completed with the “four freedoms” of movement of 
goods, services, people and money in 1993. As for financial cooperation, 
European Monetary System (EMS) was founded in 1979, and the euro was 
introduced in 1999. Another factor leading to cooperation in Europe was 
the fear of crises. For instance, in recent years, financial crisis led to deeper 
financial cooperation in the form of the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF), later European Stabilization System (ESS), and the European Sys-
tem of Financial Supervision (ESFS).
Table 4 summarizes the differences between EU and ASEAN+3 in trade and 
financial integration:
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Table 4: Summary of Differences between EU and ASEAN+3
 EU ASEAN+3
Motivation
Policy driven
The creation of an internal market for goods 
and services, labor and capital is a longstan-
ding central goal.
European integration was pursued in order to 
avoid another world war (EU, 2012).
Market driven
Open-integration
harmonization of financial regulation
East Asian countries remain mainly concerned with avoi-
ding currency and financial crises.
There is less political will in East Asia for regional integra-
tion (Pasadilla, 2008).
Currency European “currency snake”, EMS, euro
Diversity of currencies. Some countries have free-floa-
ting currency while others are pegged to the US dollar.
Trade structure
Intra-regional trade was at 63.35% in 2012 
(ARIC, 2015) 
— Not multilateral (ASEAN+3) but bilateral 
(ASEAN+1+1+1)
— Intra-regional trade in ASEAN+3 was about 38% in 
2012 (ARIC, 2015)
Organizations
EU, ECB, ESM
ESMA, EBA, EIOPA (Micro Prudential)
ESRB (Macro Prudential)
CMIM, AMRO
AMBI
Process of integration
First worked toward regional integration, 
then global
Both regional and global integration are pursued simul-
taneously.
Market Similarity
Similar
integrated market
Diverse (GDP/capita, Size, Openness etc.)
Potential policy directions for ASEAN+3
So what lessons can East Asia learn from the EU?
Firstly, political will and organization is lacking in the ASEAN+3 structure. Un-
like the supranational nature of the EU, ASEAN+3 has a very loose intergo-
vernmental structure. While institutionally the European Commission and the 
European Central Bank play a much central role in the process of the EU 
financial and trade cooperation, there are no comparable organs in East Asia. 
Indeed, in the case of CMIM, AMRO largely plays no more than an advisory 
part. Part of the reason lies in the EU’s stronger political will, which is sorely 
needed in East Asia if the region hopes for further integration.
Secondly, cooperation with IMF should be one solution. European countries 
which faced crises such as Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain and Cyprus gai-
ned help from EU and also from the IMF. In addition, IMF, EU and ECB impo-
sed conditionality and observance together (it is called troika) (EFSF, 2013). 
Moreover, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF, currently ESM) coo-
perates very closely with the IMF (ESM, 2013). In fact, IMF donated €250 bi-
llion Euros (EU’s contribution is €500 billion) for EFSF funds.
Specific policy recommendations for ASEAN+3
In light of the previous analysis, following are some key reform recommen-
dations for making the CMIM more attractive: 
1. ASEAN+3 needs to expand the size of the CMIM. The current US$240 
billion swap facility is not enough to deal with large liquidity crises. 
ASEAN+3 needs to establish a mechanism to coordinate the bilateral 
and multilateral swap arrangements; 
2. The CMIM also needs to devise a mechanism to facilitate the disburse-
ment of funds. A country facing a liquidity crisis needs quick access 
to the funds and this is constrained under the current self-managed 
system; 
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3. Review IMF conditionality is another area that most of the authors point 
out as necessary to boost the attractiveness of the CMIM; 
4. ASEAN+3 needs to further strengthen the AMRO in order to be able to 
perform better bilateral and multilateral surveillance, therefore reduc-
ing the dependence from the IMF to perform these functions.
Conclusion
ASEAN+3 economies are important trade partners with extensive pro-
duction networks across the economies. The first years of integration among 
these economies took form into a series of bilateral free trade agreements, 
further advancing trade liberalization in the region. These agreements are 
slowly evolving into a multilateral system, with initiatives such as the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) involving the 13 economies in 
the region. The conclusion of such agreement is not going to be free from 
obstacles and it is not likely to be achieved in the short-term despite of its po-
tential trade creation and FDI mobilization effects. However, looking towards 
2020, these agreements are plausible. Financial integration among ASEAN+3 
economies needs to keep pace with their increasing trade interdependence 
and the establishment of these agreements.
The most important goal of regional financial cooperation is to avoid sys-
temic risk. One of the most important ways to achieve this is by identifying 
and communicating risk. This is the reason why in a scenario of increasing 
interdependence, the economies in ASEAN+3 should work together towards 
a stronger CMIM and AMRO.
To achieve this goal ASEAN+3 economies need to build capabilities in 
the form of a stronger AMRO for bilateral and multilateral surveillance and a 
CMIM that is effective as a first line of defense, and the group has provided 
recommendations to speed up the process of financial integration by better 
identifying and communicating risks so as to keep pace with trade integra-
tion. This may be difficult to achieve in the short term, but is realistic in the 
medium-to-long term; moreover, the risks greatly justify the need for their im-
plementation.
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